He dissented from Clausewitz's emphasis on the battle as the instrument of strategy (something implicit in the Australian definitions of the levels of war). Liddell Hart constructed his definitions to reflect his criticisms of Clausewitz. Current US doctrine offers fuzzier boundaries than Australian, merely suggesting that the operational is the link between the tactical and the strategic. Luttwak, for example, postulates five levels. Now while current Australian doctrine admits three levels of war (see box) and Clausewitz discusses only two, other theorists have produced different constructs. Although, even here Clausewitz recognised that there could be exceptions and potential for blurring of the two. The battlefield was a small and well-defined place, and the battle usually short. Troops fought concentrated and weapons were, by today's standards, short-ranged. Control was limited by what the commander could see, and the distances travelled by visual and audio signals. Thus Clausewitz himself followed the traditional view that tactics was what happened on the battlefield, and strategy was everything that led to and from it. According to our classification, then, tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement strategy, the use of engagements for the object of the war. One has been called tactics, and the other strategy. This gives rise to the completely different activity of planning and executing these engagements themselves, and of coordinating each of them with the others in order to further the object of the war. However, it consists of a greater or lesser number of single acts, each complete in itself, which. If fighting consisted of a single act, no further subdivision would be needed. That we should seek to equate Clausewitz with belief in three levels of war is curious, as is the way in which we assert that he distinguished between them.